Introduction
Along with other efforts to address climate change with green technologies and greater energy efficiency, a recent push to make the electricity grid 'smart' is bringing new information technologies into homes and businesses across the United States (US) and in the European Union (EU). The new technologies-in this Chapter, I will focus on smart electricity meters and other devices that gather or process household energy signatures at high temporal resolutions-have a great deal of promise. Among other predicted benefits, smart grid technologies are expected to help us better manage energy usage, enable real-time demandresponse pricing, improve efficient load balancing across the grid, and increase the capacity for solar and other edge-based energy generation. These predicted benefits depend, in part, on new, richer data models of energy flow and usage. As such, the detailed information collected by advanced metering technologies is of interest to governments, utilities, their customers, and companies developing new technologies and services intended to support efficient energy generation, transmission, distribution and use.
Smarter energy technologies promise to provide substantial support to societal efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. At the same time, the temporally granular data collected by advanced metering technologies can reveal detailed information about intimate life within the home, raising serious questions about how to address privacy interests. As far back as 1989, George Hart, one of the inventors of the computational technologies that make it possible to 'see' into a home by observing detailed energy consumption data, predicted the surveillance potential of what we now call smart technologies. 1 Hart argued that the ethical and legal questions they raised must be addressed. 2 Because detailed energy usage data has this capacity to reveal information about activities within a home and the habits of its occupants, it is also likely to be of interest to many beyond the energy industry, including law enforcement, marketers, insurance companies, even criminals.
pricing information and other information. 5 These advanced metering systems are expected to tie into home area networks (HAN) of communications devices that gather and communicate data and respond to pricing and other signals from utilities or third-party providers. 6 Finally, at their most general level, definitions of the smart grid often include new business models, new regulatory frameworks, and new energy supplier and customer behaviors that are expected to arise from modernizing the grid's physical components. 7 Figure 1 shows some of the main components of the smart grid. Plans to modernize the electrical grid are the subject of a concerted push by the White House and US agencies, individual states, the EU, China and other countries. As described more fully in the Chapter by Steven Ferrey, improving electricity generation and delivery is seen by government officials as key to combating climate change. Moving to a distributed generation system that supports less carbon-intensive fuels is a central part of that effort. There thus is growing investment in smart grid programs. And a substantial portion of smart grid investment worldwide is devoted to smart meter installation. to 141 million meters. 16 In California, a leader in smart grid deployment within the US, utilities predicted that more than 14 million meters would be installed by the end of 2012.
Overall, the US is projected to invest between $338 and $476 billion in smart grid investments by 2030. 17 But as rapidly as the US is moving, the EU is, by some measures, further along. The EU pushed for smart meter deployment in its Third Energy Package in 2009. 18 By 2011, 45 million smart meters were already installed in EU countries, with 240 million projected to be installed by 2020. 19 China is also investing aggressively in the smart grid and in smart meters;
it has created the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), which plans to invest $601 billion to build out a nationwide smart grid by 2020, and to install 360 million smart meters by 2030. 20 Other countries are following suit: South Korea plans to install 24 million smart meters by 2020; India plans to install 130 million, also by 2020; and Brazil plans to install 63 million by 2021. 21 Industry investment in smart grid devices and services is also growing rapidly. The dual incentives of government funding and the opportunity to build and exploit new clean technology markets have created a so-called 'smart grid gold rush' to provide devices and services to consumers, utilities and organizations. New companies are in the process of rolling out personal metering systems, energy efficiency services, home area network devices, smart appliances and other innovations intended to meet the expected demand for smart grid services. 22 Taken as a whole, the implementation of AMI, the addition of consumer appliances at the grid's edge, and the addition of new, third-party service providers is expected to expand the traditional grid into a complex energy data ecosystem.
We can expect to see profound changes in grid infrastructure within the next two decades as nation-states move aggressively to upgrade their systems and as private industry responds with new technologies and services. As this build-out occurs, the collection and use of energy consumption data will increase. As described in the next sections, new devices, new forms of data, new data uses, and new data flows, together with the greatly increased complexity and inter-connectivity of the smart grid communications network, present fundamental privacy and security issues that will need to be addressed as the smart grid buildout progresses.
Privacy issues presented by the smart grid ecosystem
Implementing the smart grid technological ecosystem, as envisioned by government agencies and industry actors, includes major changes in energy data practices. At least three dramatic shifts are included within these changes: (1) changes in the characteristics of energy usage data that make it much more revealing of activities within a premises than previous data forms; (2) changes in the purposes for which the data is used that could result in substantial privacy impacts for energy customers; and (3) changes in data flows that greatly expand the paths energy data travels and the locations in which it is held. Each of these changes presents acute questions about how to manage privacy and security issues created by smart grid technologies and business practices.
Changes in energy data characteristics
The first shift lies in the fact that AMI technologies collect far more comprehensive information about energy usage within individual premises than the traditional electromechanical meters with which most customers are familiar. The highly granular data collected by smart meters and smart appliances can reveal a detailed picture of activities occurring within customers' homes or other premises-spaces that traditionally have been treated as private and protected from surveillance by legal safeguards.
The data that smart meters and other smart technologies can collect is more detailed along a number of dimensions than was previously collected data. First, advanced metering devices collect much more temporally granular data than older devices. The shift is dramatic. Second, smart grid technologies will allow utilities (and perhaps appliance manufacturers, third-party energy efficiency services, or others) to collect electricity consumption data from a single, uniquely identified home appliance. Historically, only aggregate electricity consumption data of all appliances within a household has been collected.
Third, a much greater variety of information is likely to be collected and processed by smart grid technologies than that collected and used by conventional energy devices and services. For example, in addition to energy consumption data and unique appliance identifiers, utilities or other service providers may also collect information about the efficiency of home appliances, the size of a home and the temperature inside it, location information from plug-in hybrid electric vehicles within the smart grid and so on.
The shift to a smarter grid thus represents a tremendous increase in the amount and detail of energy usage data collected compared to previous systems. At 15-minute collection intervals, a smart meter gathers approximately 3000 data points per month about an individual household's energy consumption-a profound change from the one data point per month collected from electromechanical meters by individual meter readers. Consumers can also buy devices that can be installed 'below the meter' (that is, within the house) and that can take finegrained measurements of energy consumption. For example, 'The Energy Detective' is a consumer device that records consumption from its installation point where household circuits converge at the top of the breaker box and transmits the data to a home computer or to a thirdparty energy service provider for processing. 24 Further, smart appliances that communicate their specific usage patterns-for example, smart washing machines and other appliances that communicate with the utility to receive time-of-use pricing information -are increasingly available in the marketplace. NALM uses temporally granular energy consumption data to reveal usage patterns for individual appliances within a house-for example, when a refrigerator or heating system cycles on and off, when the stove or big-screen television is in use, and in some cases even when an individual light is turned on or off. 27 and exact usage characteristics of the individual appliances within the home which constitute the load. The monitor requires only the information externally available from measurements of the load; no entry into the home is necessary to place sensors on separate appliances or branch circuits; no appliance survey or other cooperation from the residents is required. 29 Hart also described how NALM worked to remotely identify and monitor specific appliances within a premises and explained that detailed energy load data on end-use devices could help utilities to balance loads, encourage energy-conscious individuals to reduce their monthly bills, and assist trouble-shooters to locate failing devices. But the principal point Hart wished to convey was ethical in nature, not technical. He expressed a deep concern that, although the 'intended use of the [monitoring] device is completely benign', NALM could be used to observe occupants of buildings unobtrusively. 'From [its] unseen and unsuspected vantage point, the monitor has a view deep into the workings of the residence. After observing the residence for a short while, it generates a list of objects (appliances) and events (usages) that the occupants may consider completely private'.
The granular data collected by today's advanced metering devices are assumed to be a key component of the new smartness of the upgraded electricity grid. As Hart recognized almost from the beginning, however, and as policymakers, utilities, innovators, and consumers are beginning to wrestle with today, it is also sufficiently revealing of the details of intimate home life to have very different effects on privacy from historical forms of energy data.
Further, it has more recently become clear that granular energy usage data cannot easily be anonymized; like other rich types of information, 'anonymized' energy usage data is vulnerable to 're-identification' attacks that serve to tie profiling information back to specific homes. 30 
Changes in the uses and users of energy data
The rich details of smart grid data, and their ability to reveal appliance use and household activities, make such data attractive for a wide range of new purposes. Such granular data allows for the possibility of real-time pricing and demand-response systems and other utility-run energy management programs that could help combat climate change through lowering production emissions and energy demand. Real-time or near real-time information is widely expected to help utilities more efficiently balance load, respond to power outages, and enhance grid defenses against attack. 31 Smart grid data also can support customer devices and non-utility providers of related services that help customers lower their electricity bills and increase efficiency by tracking time-of-day usage and habits and by pinpointing inefficient appliances and behaviors.
Smart technology may eventually allow utilities to implement detailed peak-demand, time-of-use pricing, which may induce further shifts in consumer usage patterns and further reduce peak loads, strain on the grid, and consumer charges. 32 Some customer advocates, however, worry that energy bills will increase for customers who, for health or other reasons, do not have the option of changing the amount of or times they use energy. 33 Further, the overall efficiency savings predicted for these programs are disputed. 34 Examples of such new or anticipated data uses abound. Utilities and third-party providers are rolling out a variety of devices and programs that allow customers to visualize their energy usage and to pinpoint inefficient behaviors and appliances, allowing tailored energy efficiency planning. 35 The detailed data and two-way communication capabilities
provided by smart meters are expected to support and extend utility programs that reach into a home or other premises, and may request or even require that customers shut off appliances or otherwise shed loads. For example, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) offers a 'SmartAC program' in which PG&E installs programmable thermostats for customers' air conditioners.
These thermostats engage directly in two-way communications with the utility. 36 PG&E might use the communication channel to display messages on the screen of the thermostat, such as weather warnings, greetings and system maintenance notices. 37 Consumers can also configure their thermostats on PG&E's website, 38 giving the utility company information about consumers' temperature preference in their homes. Further, smart grid data is likely to extend existing grid management programs. Florida Light & Power (FLP), for example, has long offered customers a monthly billing credit in return for giving FLP the ability to remotely cycle off participants' air conditioners for short periods during times of peak demand. 39 The smart grid may offer additional, unforeseen methods for combating climate change, Such beneficial uses are promising. At the same time, as Hart observed, such data is likely to be attractive for more generalized behavioral tracking and surveillance. The fact that smart grid data provides a virtual window into household activities is likely to make it highly attractive for a number of purposes that create strong privacy risks. Utilities, energy-efficiency service providers, or other energy-sector providers may find the data useful for marketing campaigns or for other purposes beyond energy provisioning. 42 Third parties outside of the energy industry are likely to find the data equally attractive for any number of marketing or profiling purposes. For example, information about daily habits may be valuable to marketers looking to promote new, energy-efficient appliances, as well as to other marketers of goods and services looking to add behavioral information to their consumer profiles. The data should be attractive to any sector that uses consumer profiling.
uses of smart grid data. In 2010 a US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
working group, in a comprehensive report on cyber security and privacy in the smart grid (NIST Guidelines 1), 43 catalogued a wide variety of potential uses of detailed energy usage and smart appliance data. The NIST group identified 'primary' uses for the data, which include load monitoring and load forecasting, demand response and efficiency programs, and consumption billing for PEVs. The group also identified a wide range of plausible 'secondary uses,' which include: use by law enforcement and litigants for investigations and evidentiary purposes; use of behavioral and location data by insurance companies to determine premiums for home, health and driving insurance; use of behavioral data by creditors to assess credit risk;
use by advertisers for targeted marketing campaigns; use by law enforcement, private investigators, or criminals to determine the location of PEVs or other location-aware appliances; and use by the press to investigate the habits of famous or otherwise newsworthy individuals. 44 In September 2014, NIST issued an updated report (NIST Guidelines 2), 45 which included further recommendations for managing privacy issues in the smart grid 46 and added a legal and policy update. 47 The most substantial update consists of nearly four dozen use cases that apply the guidelines' privacy framework to concrete applications ranging from routine utility load balancing to plug-in electric vehicles. 48 This updated guideline document is a key resource.
While it is impossible at this stage in the smart grid's development to accurately predict the details of how data will be used, some of the uses identified by the NIST working group have clear historical precedents and seem very likely to occur. For example, detailed information about household activity is highly likely to be attractive to criminal investigators and other government actors who wish to investigate past acts and ongoing crimes. Lessdetailed energy usage records have long been used by investigators to identify possible drug operations 49 ; the richer data provided by smart grid systems almost certainly will be seen as an attractive investigative tool. As real-time data collection comes online, the use of granular energy usage data for ongoing surveillance also may become a plausible scenario. Similarly smart grid data is likely to be attractive to civil litigants, such as those involved in divorce proceedings or insurance disputes that present questions about daily habits or occupancy patterns. And smart grid data is likely to be attractive to criminals themselves, who might wish to know when a household is occupied or empty, or to gain access to a database of revealing profile information. All of these purposes raise serious questions about the appropriate legal standards for access to the data and the necessary level of security for data streams and data collections.
Changes in data flows
Third, data that previously flowed in one direction-from the customer to the utilitynow flows in many more directions: bi-directionally between the utility and the customer; from the utility or the customer to third-party service providers; and from various entities to tertiary • Meter data sent from a smart meter to the utility
• Meter data sent from a smart meter to a HAN
• Energy usage information collected by a customer-owned meter
• Data flowing within a customer-owned energy management system
• Energy usage information sent via a customer device or communication to a third party energy management system or service
• Third party access to energy usage information held by a utility
• Direct communication between a utility and HAN devices
• Data flows involving PEVs, which add information about the location-outside the home-of the PEV user.
In discussing each of the identified energy flow patterns, the PIER Report described existing legal protections, and concluded that current protections 'apply to a narrow slice of Smart Grid data and, even then, they treat different Smart Grid actors inconsistently'. 51 It concludes that the integration of information technology with the electrical grid and the wide range of new data flows created, 'present considerable risks to individual privacy'. 52 The PIER Report recommended a systematic approach to implementing privacy protections through architectural and information flow design as well as through policy. In making these recommendations, it joined a growing consensus view that a system-wide 'privacy by design' approach is necessary to protecting privacy in a modernized grid system.
Addressing smart grid data privacy: a developing policy landscape
Policymakers are only beginning to address the privacy and security issues presented by detailed energy usage monitoring. Hart identified many of them in 1989. He noted that NALM's surveillance capabilities raised serious moral and legal questions, touching on civil liberties and due process of law. He thus raised a number of important questions related to who should have access to the data, who should control NALM devices, and who should bear responsibility for data breaches. 53 He noted, however, that his concerns were not shared by other scientists and engineers of his acquaintance. Though some offered technical ideas for improving security and avoiding identification errors, some doubted whether privacy issues even had a place in technical discussions. Privacy questions did not arise again until the recent push to expand AMI systems to create the smart grid.
Accordingly, existing legal standards for control of and access to energy consumption data, and legal protections for it, generally were developed with historical, aggregated (typically monthly) data forms in mind. Most US utilities historically required only a subpoena before they would release energy records to law enforcement. 54 The current required showing that police investigators must make before gaining access to utility data is unclear at best.
While a patchwork of state statutes, federal statutes and utility commission regulations apply to various aspects of the smart grid (as the PIER Report and others have found), they apply inconsistently and incompletely. 55 Researchers Deirdre K. Mulligan and Jack I. Lerner reviewed Fourth Amendment and state constitutional jurisprudence, and found that monthly aggregated data was often found to have little or no constitutional protection; court decisions repeatedly connected these conclusions to the courts' understandings that traditional aggregrated data was essentially unrevealing. 56 In contrast, the greater specificity of smart-grid data may raise constitutional concerns, particularly in regard to surveillance of homes. As Justice Scalia noted in Kyllo v.
United States
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, which found that police may not peer into a house via thermal imaging technology without a warrant, '[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes'. 58 As such, the new forms of energy usage data created by smart meters are at odds with previous courts' reasoning in holding that monthly aggregated consumption data does not require constitutional protection and at odds with the incomplete statutory protection in place today. The California Rule followed a broad consensus, based on a full implementation of In translating the principles into regulatory language, the CPUC followed calls to apply the HEW FIPPs by DOC, 63 the Obama Administration's National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), 64 and NIST in its Guidelines 1, 65 and by others.
It remains to be seen whether the present regulatory discussions will be adequate to protect smart grid data, or whether they will require adjustment in the future. Even California's relatively comprehensive approach leaves questions unanswered. As the CPUC moved to release data for government, business, environmental, and research uses, it began to confront difficult privacy and security issues such as data breaches and re-identification threats. And importantly, third parties (outside of the customer-utility relationship) that receive data directly from a customer's smart meter or from another customer device (so-called 'below the meter' devices) are not necessarily covered by the California Rule. The CPUC found its jurisdiction clearly to extend to regulated utilities and to entities that receive information from the utilities, but left open the question of whether it may regulate energy data that flows directly from the customer. 66 Traditionally US public utility commissions regulate only to the 'demarcation point' of the meter and do not extend their regulations inside houses. This leaves a large piece of the overall smart grid data ecosystem under the auspices of the ill-fitting and piecemeal presmart-grid regime. As such, pressure remains on federal and state legislatures to consider broader protections.
Overall, the policy landscape around smart grid data is changing rapidly, and a number of regulatory efforts to address both privacy and security issues are underway in both the US and EU. In such a highly dynamic environment, the governmental reports cited earlier can provide a foundational background, and the California Rule and ensuing CPUC efforts can provide a detailed exemplar of regulation. But whether privacy issues will be adequately addressed across jurisdictions-and whether they will be addressed in a manner that supports innovation while building protections into system design-is a question that remains to be answered.
Note on cyber-security issues: a pressing issue
In keeping with the information-policy focus of this book, this Chapter mainly concerns itself with privacy. It is important to note, however, that the privacy and confidentiality issues presented by granular usage data make up a subset of the serious technical security issues presented by the shift to a smarter grid. As grids become "smarter," they are becoming both much more complex than before, incorporating far more devices and involving far more actors, and much more interconnected, incorporating several network layers and many communication protocols, including increasing connections to the Internet and other open networks. 67 Indeed, the smart grid will connect millions of local area networks, which each contain a variety of sensors, meters, or other devices. 68 In addition, the smart grid is planned to be highly automated, increasing the number of electronic controls. 69 Each of these changes introduce multiple entry points for attack and other vulnerabilities, some of which are exacerbated by widespread use of wireless data transmission. For example, home energy devices and smart meters nearly all communicate within Home Area Networks and with utility systems wirelessly. The introduction to the NIST Guidelines 2 notes that risks associated with the evolution of the Smart Grid 'include:
• Increasing the complexity of the grid could introduce vulnerabilities and increase
• exposure to potential attackers and unintentional errors;
• Interconnected networks can introduce common vulnerabilities;
• Increasing vulnerabilities to communication disruptions and the introduction of malicious software/firmware or compromised hardware could result in denial of service (DoS) or other malicious attacks;
• Interconnected systems can increase the amount of private information exposed and
• increase the risk when data is aggregated;
• Increased use of new technologies can introduce new vulnerabilities; and
• Expansion of the amount of data that will be collected that can lead to the potential for compromise of data confidentiality, including the breach of customer privacy.' 70 The Guidelines further explain that this increased interconnectedness increasing the risk of 'cascading failures' that compromise multiple systems.
These technical vulnerabilities are coupled with a high practical risk of attack and very serious potential consequences if cyber-security measures fail. As critical infrastructure, any country's grid is attractive to the full gamut of attackers, from cyber-criminals to state actors.
Smart grid infrastructures in the United States and in other countries have repeatedly been attacked both by criminals demanding extortion payments after cutting power and by state actors. This attractiveness, and the potential negative consequences of a successful attack, increases with the smart grid's increasing flows of valuable and sensitive data, increased physical vulnerabilities, and increased opportunities for creating cascading failures. 71 The smart grid's complexity and interconnection also makes it vulnerable to mistakes or malicious behavior by insiders. 72 Finally, utilities are not well versed in cyber-security, and as such, must catch up. Accordingly, smart grid cyber-security is recognized as a crucial concern by governments, leading to efforts such as the NIST Guidelines.
A more complete discussion is beyond the scope of this Chapter. However, key resources include the NIST Guidelines 2 and a second PIER report, 'Smart Grid Cyber Security Potential Threats, Vulnerabilities and Risks.'
73
Conclusion
The value of smarter electricity delivery and use, along with the substantial investments already made in both EU and US jurisdictions, make it highly likely that smart grid deployment will continue and accelerate. In light of this rapid shift, George Hart's 1989 questions about NALM and its privacy implications look prescient today.
The rapid deployment of smart grid technologies, if not carefully executed, has the potential to introduce serious security and privacy flaws to the grid. These flaws may then become 'baked in' to technical designs and business practices. Fixing such problems later will be a costly and difficult enterprise. In contrast, the relatively nascent state of the technology and the fact that industry and policymakers anticipate a fundamental grid system overhaul
